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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BAR ADMISSION PROCEDURES:
INQUIRY INTO POLITICAL BELIEFS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Sara Baird passed the Arizona state bar examination and revealed on
the bar committee's questionnaire all the organizations with which she
had been associated since she reached 16 years of age. However, she re-
fused to answer question No. 27 which asked if she was presently or had
ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization which
advocates the overthrow of the United States Government by force or
violence. Solely because of her refusal to answer this question,' the bar
committee declined to process her application further or to recommend
her admission to the bar. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld her denial
of admission to the state bar association. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court held that a state is limited by the first amendment 2
and may not inquire about a bar applicant's beliefs or associations solely
for the purpose of denying him admission because of what he believes.
The Court concluded that Arizona engaged in such questioning and thus
reversed and remanded the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
Martin Stolar, a member of the New York bar, applied for admis-
sion to the Ohio state bar. On oral interrogation by the Ohio Bar Com-
mittee, Stolar stated that he was not presently nor had he ever been a
member of the Communist Party, of any socialist party, or of the Students
for a Democratic Society. However, he refused to answer three questions
on the Ohio application: question 12 (g), which asked about member-
ship in any organization which advocates the forceful overthrow of the
United States Government; question 13 which sought a listing of all
clubs, societies or organizations of which he had ever been a member;
and question 7, which requested a listing of membership in all organiza-
tions since registering as a law student. Because of his refusal to answer
these three questions, the Ohio committee denied Stolar admission to the
Ohio state bar and the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the denial. On cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment
1. Brief for Petitioner, at 3-4, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
2. The first amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth, for-
bids any "law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people, peaceably to assemble. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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prohibits a state from penalizing a man solely because he is a member of
a particular organization and that it is impermissible to require a bar ap-
plicant to either list his membership in any organization which advocates
the overthrow of the United States Government by force or to list all the
organizations of which he has been a member. The Court thus reversed
and remanded the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court. In re Stolar,
401 U.S. 23 (1971).
The Law Students Civil Rights Research Counci 3 instituted two sep-
arate actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs
attacked the constitutionality of New York's statutes, rules, and screening
procedures for determining the character and fitness of applicants to the
New York bar. The basic thrust of the plaintiffs' attack was that New
York's screening system by its very existence works a "chilling effect"
upon the free exercise of the rights of speech and association of students
who must anticipate having to meet its requirements. A three-judge dis-
trict court consolidated the suits and found certain items on the ques-
tionnaires as they then stood to be so vague, overbroad, and intrusive
upon applicants' private lives as to be of doubtful constitutional validity.4
It granted the partial relief indicated by these findings, approved revised
questions, and otherwise sustained the validity of New York's system.
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court was not persuaded
that New York's screening system worked "chilling effects" upon the ex-
ercise of constitutional freedoms. The Court found that questions de-
signed to determine the applicant's belief in and loyalty to the United
States Government by judging his willingness to take an oath to support
the Constitution, were within constitutionally prescribed limits. The
Court also held as constitutional a two part question concerning an appli-
cant's knowing membership in organizations advocating violent over-
throw of the government and his specific intent to further such aims.
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment of the district court. Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971).
3. The plaintiffs in this case included the Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, an organization of 1500 law students at 60 law schools, and also three
law graduates, all of whom were seeking or were planning to seek admission to
practice law in New York. The plaintiffs shall hereinafter be identified as
LSCRRC. Defendants included two New York Bar Association Committees on
Character and Fitness and their members and two appellate divisions and their
judges.
4. Law Student Civil Rights Research Council [LSCRRC] v. Wadmond, 299
F. Supp. 117 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
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The significance of these three cases lies in the fact that they extend
first amendment rights of belief and association to bar admission situa-
tions. They also set a standard which limits permissible inquiries by
state bar associations. Justice Black in delivering the principal opinions
in Baird and in Stolar makes reference to the "confusion and uncertainty
created by past cases in this constitutional field."," Cases in this area,
whether they involve doctors, lawyers, or government employees, concern
themselves with the extent to which the Constitution protects persons
against governmental intrusion and invasion into private beliefs and views
which have not ripened into any punishable conduct., The Court in
Baird did not attempt to completely reconcile its decision with all that
the Court had said in previous cases dealing with this particular phase
of first amendment protection.7 Rather the Court chose to handle Baird
by narrating its simple facts and by relating them to the forty-five words
of the first amendment. s
In the Wadmond case, Justice Black, this time with the minority, de-
livered a dissent in which he stated that he had difficulty reconciling
Wadmond with Baird and Stolar:
In Baird and Stolar five members of the Court agreed that questions asked by Bar
admission committees were invalid because they inquired about activities protected
by the First Amendment. Why then is the same result not required here? 9
Thus, we have a situation in which Baird and Stolar cannot be com-
pletely reconciled with past cases, and a further complication in which
Wadmond cannot be reconciled with Baird and Stolar.
The purpose of this casenote will be to attempt to reconcile the appar-
ent confusion which these three cases bring to an already confused con-
stitutional area. This attempt at reconciliation will necessitate a brief
examination of the past cases which created the confusion, an analysis
of the pertinent facts and issues1 ° involved in the present three cases, and
a projection concerning the impact that these three cases will have on
future decisions.
5. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 24 (1971).
6. Id. at 24-25.
7. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).
8. Id. at 4.
9. LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 182 (1971).
10. Wadmond involved a broad attack on the screening system for admission to
the New York bar. In this casenote we shall limit ourselves to a consideration of
the issues and holdings which directly relate to Baird and Stolar. Our concern is
primarily with first amendment rights and we shall only briefly consider other
areas of bar admission procedures such as the sources of a state's power to regulate
bar admission procedures and requirements.
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Historically, situations where lawyers have been denied their right" to
practice law because of their political beliefs and associations have arisen at
times when concern for national security was in sharp focus. After the
Civil War the problem of interrelating loyalty with the right to practice
law came to the fore in Ex parte Garland.'2  The Supreme Court in that
case delineated the authority of a state to regulate admission to the bar
and other licensed professions: "The Legislature may undoubtedly pre-
scribe qualifications for the office [of attorney], to which he [the applicant]
must conform.' 3  Since Garland the Court has repeatedly deferred to state
legislatures and has intervened in only a few cases where an applicant to the
bar has been denied admission because there has been an infringement by
the state against a right protected by the Constitution.
After World War I, the problem of loyalty and lawyers arose in the
context of disbarment rather than admission to the bar.' 4 The problem
subsided during the years between the wars and not until the late World
War II case of In re Summers15 did the problem of bar admissions be-
come a significant issue. The Supreme Court in Summers recognized
that bar admission proceedings which deny the right to practice are sub-
ject to judicial review when constitutional questions are raised.' 6 The
Court found that Illinois did not discriminate against any first amendment
right of the bar applicant. The Court could also find no violation of a
federal right secured by the fourteenth amendment and therefore sus-
tained the bar admission refusal. 17 The Court's treatment of this case
typified both its historical reluctance to interfere in state bar admission
proceedings and its avoidance of the use of the first amendment. The
11. Justice Black, delivering the plurality opinion in Baird, stated: "The
practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his
learning and his moral character." Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8(1971). See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); In re
Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
12. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
13. Id. at 379. Accord, Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (the
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois that females were not eligible to practice
law under the statutes of Illinois did not violate any provision of the Constitution);
In rc Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
could construe the state's statute to determine whether the word "person" was con-
fined to males and whether women can be admitted to practice law).
14. See, e.g., In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196 P. 670 (1921) (disbarment
reversed and held that a lawyer's pro-German attitude toward World War I did
not mean that he could not support and uphold the law).
15. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
16. Id. at 568-69.
17. Id. at 571-73.
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reliance on the fourteenth amendment created the legal framework for
handling bar admission cases in the 50's and 60's.
The 50's found the United States in a period of acute national concern
with the Communist Party.18 Under the cloud of the McCarthy hearings,
cases involving problems with bar admission proceedings were again be-
fore the Supreme Court. In Schware v. Board of Examiners9 the Court
held that a state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law in a
manner or for reasons that contravene the due process or equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and that any qualifications
which the state requires must have a rational connection with the appli-
cant's fitness or capacity to practice law. With respect to Schware's
prior membership in the Communist Party, the Court concluded that this
past membership did not justify an inference that Schware presently had
a bad moral character. 20  Because a decision was reached on the basis
of the fourteenth amendment, the Court found it unnecessary to decide
the issue of the right of free political association. 21
In a case decided the same day, Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia,22 the Court also used due process grounds to strike down infer-
ences made concerning Konigsberg's moral character and his advocacy
of the overthrow of the government. Concerning his refusal to answer
questions about his political associations, the Court noted that Konigs-
berg's claim that the questions were improper was not frivolous and that
there was nothing in the record that indicated his position was not taken
in good faith.23 The Court especially noted that it was not deciding the
issue of the constitutionality of the committee's questions and that Konigs-
berg was not denied admission to the California bar just because of his
refusal to answer the questions. Prophetically the Court stated:
If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred Konigsberg solely because
of his refusal to respond to its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions
about matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to decide far-reaching
and complex questions relating to freedom of speech, press and assembly ....
If and when a State makes failure to answer a question an independent ground for
exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, will have to determine
whether the exclusion is constitutionally permissible. 24
18. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 3 (1971); In Re Stolar, 401
U.S. 23, 24 (1971).
19. 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
20. Id. at 243-45.
21. Id. at 243 n.13.
22. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
23. Id. at 270-71.
24. Id. at 261.
528 [Vol. XXII
CASE NOTES
The opportunity to meet this issue was presented by the same Konigsberg
in the early 60's, but the Court still avoided using the first amendment to
resolve the question.
On remand, the Konigsberg case was referred to the California Bar
Committee for further consideration. Forewarned by the committee that
his refusal to answer any questions pertaining to his membership in the
Communist Party would result in his exclusion from the bar, Konigsberg
nevertheless refused to answer. The committee declined to certify him
"on the ground that his refusals to answer had obstructed a full investiga-
tion into his qualifications. '25 The United States Supreme Court ac-
cepted the validity of the California rule26 that an applicant for admis-
sion to the bar has the burden of proving good moral character, and con-
cluded that the fourteenth amendment's protection against arbitrary state
action does not prevent a state from denying admission to a bar applicant
who refuses to give unprivileged answers to questions which have a sub-
stantial relevance to his qualifications. 27 The Court, therefore, held that
the committee was prevented from discharging its duty by Konigsberg's
refusal to answer relevant questions and thus affirmed the denial of ad-
mission. 28
A similar result was arrived at in the case of In re Anastaplo,2 9 which
was decided the same day as Konigsberg II. The Court, substantially
on the basis of Konigsberg II, affirmed Illinois' denial of bar admission to
George Anastaplo. On the basis of the record the Court concluded that
Anastaplo had been fairly warned that exclusion from the bar might fol-
low from his refusal to answer relevant questions and that his exclusion
was not arbitrary and discriminatory. 0
Because neither Konigsberg II nor In re Anastaplo were expressly over-
ruled by the Baird, Stolar or Wadmond cases, it is important that Konigs-
berg II and Anastaplo be distinguished from the three principal cases of
this note. Two major distinctions can be made. First, in both Konigs-
berg II and Anastaplo, the question of Communist Party membership was
significantly involved. 51  The Court in these two cases held that ques-
25. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 39 (1961) [hereinafter
the Konigsberg cases will be referred to as Konigsberg I and Konigsberg 11].
26. CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 6060 (1937).
27. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961).
28. Id. at 56.
29. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
30. Id. at 94.
31. Konigsberg II and Anastaplo are distinguishable since testimony revealed
that Konigsberg had been involved with the Communist Party, Konigsberg v.
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tions concerning Communist Party membership were relevant to the de-
termination of moral fitness and the refusal of the applicant to answer
the questions obstructed the inquiry of the bar committee. This holding
is in line with past cases where the Communist Party has been treated
sui generis by the Supreme Court in the light of Congre-sional and judi-
cial findingsA2 A second distinction is the fact that in both Konigsberg
II and Anastaplo there was "no showing of an intent to penalize political
beliefs."33
An indication of the Court's shift in the early 70's from fourteenth
amendment to first amendment grounds in dealing with bar admission
proceedings was given by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Ko-
nigsberg 118 4  Justice Black attacked the Court's use of the "balancing
of interests" theory which had been advocated by Justice Harlan. 5 In
State Bar of Califonia, 366 U.S. 36, 271-73 (1961), while the only evidence pe-
sented concerning Anastaplo was his refusal to answer questions concerning mem-
bzrship in the Communist Paity, In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
32. Brief for Petitioner at 18, In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971). See Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 127-28 (1959). See also C. PRrrCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 544-
50 (2nd ed. 1968) concerning the "curious" status the Communist Party has had in
legal issues.
33. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 54 (1961). See In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 95 (1961): "[Tlhere is nothing in the record which
would justify our holding that the State has invoked its exclusionary refusal-to-
answer rule as a mask for its disapproval of petitioner's notions on the right to over-
throw tyrannical govenment."
34. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 56-80 (1961).
35. Id. at 49-56. Justices Black and Harlan were on opposing sides in
Konicsberg I, Konigsberg 11, and Anastaplo, as well as in the three principal cases
of this note. In delivering the decision of the Court in Konigsberg I1, Justice Har-
hin folloved his "balancing of interests" theory in treating the issue of free speech
and association. He began by rejecting the view that freedom of speech and
associaion are absolutes. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Rules
compelling the disclosure of prior association are placed in the category of general
regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech, but incidentally
limiting its unfettered exercise. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
This type of disclosure does not violate the first or fourteenth amendments when it
is subordinate to a valid governmental interest. When constitutional protections
are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must
be effected and that requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests in-
volved. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959). With respect to
the questioning of public employees relative to Communist Party memberships, the
Court had previously held that the interest in not subjecting speech and association
to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the state's interest in as-
certaining the fitness of the employee for the post he holds and therefore such ques-
tioning does not infringe upon constitutional protections. Beilan v. Board of
Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716
(1951).
Justice Harlan concluded that with respect to Communist Party membership, the
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the view of Justice Black, the "balancing of interests" doctrine permits
constitutionally protected rights to be "balanced" away whenever a ma-
jority of the Court thinks that the state's interest i3 sufficient to justify
abridgement of those freedoms. Justice Black, in accord with his "ab-
solute" theory, remarked that he did not know to what extent the Court's
suggestion would hold true that a literal reading of the first amendment
would be unreasonable because it would invalidate many widely accepted
laws.3 7 Ten years later, Justice Black took such a position in delivering
the opinion of the Court in Baird. He penetrated the existing confusion,
and simply narrated the facts of the case and related them to the forty-
five words of the first amendment.
Following the past historical trend, problems of the early 70's concern-
ing bar admissions arose again during a time of unrest in our country.
This time the struggle was not with external forces, but with the internal
conflicts which erupted into the streets and onto college campuses. The
role of attorneys came under close scrutiny as William Kunstler, defense
counsel in the Chicago Seven conspiracy trial,"8 dominated the news
media with his unusual trial conduct.3 9  The effect of these occurrences
on bar examining committees and on reviewing courts is difficult to de-
termine. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did change its approach to
bar admission problems in the Baird, Stolar, and Wadmond cases.
By no means was any consensus reached in these three decisions. All
were decided by 5-4 margins and a total of eleven opinions was delivered
by the Court. Just as he had in the Konigsberg II and A nastaplo cases,
Justice Stewart cast the deciding vote in all three cases. 40  He concurred
state's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense
is clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned
by compulsory disclosure. Justice Harlan did not foresee any deterrence of associa-
tion because bar committee interrogations are conducted in private, and neither
would the state be afforded the opportunity for imposing undetectable arbitrary
consequences upon protected association because a bar applicant's exclusion by
reason of Communist Party membership is subject to judicial review. Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
36. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961). Justice
Black further discusses "balancing" and "absolutes" in his dissenting opinion in
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97-116 (1961). See also Black, The Bill of Rights,
35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960).
37. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 64 (1961).
38. United States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. 69-180 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 6, 1971).
39. For a further elaboration of disruptions in courtroom proceedings and a
proposed remedy see Comment, Judicial Administration-Technological Advances
-Use of Videotape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse, 20 DEPAUL L. REV.
924 (1971).
40. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Harlan, and White decided for
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with Justice Black in the plurality opinions in Baird and Stolar and deliv-
ered the majority opinion in Wadmond. It will be important therefore
to carefully analyze Justice Stewart's assessment of the record in each of
the three cases.
In the plurality opinion of Baird, Justice Black reflected that courts
have in the past been sharply divided about questions involving beliefs
and associations and refusals to allow people to hold public and even
private jobs solely because public authorities have been suspicious of
their ideas. 41 Continuing his "absolute" theory from Konigsberg H and
Anastaplo, Justice Black noted that freedom to believe is absolute under
the first amendment and that the protection of the first amendment 4 2 also
extends to the right of association. 43
A state is prohibited from excluding a person from a profession solely
because he is a member of a particular political organization or because
he holds certain beliefs. 44  The Court thus held that views and beliefs
are immune from bar association inquiries which are designed to lay a
foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law and con-
the state in each case. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall decided
against the state in all three cases.
41. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (statute making it
a crime for any member of a Communist Party organization to be employed in
any defense facility held to be an unconstitutional abridgement of the right of
association on first amendment overbreadth grounds); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (statute sanctioning a teacher's mere knowing
membership in the Communist Party without any showing of specific intent to fur-
ther the Party's unlawful aims held invalid on first amendment overbreadth
grounds); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (loyalty oath and accompanying
statutory gloss which proscribed mere knowing membership in the Communist
Party by public employees unconstitutionally infringed protected freedoms),
noted in 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 209 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(statute requiring all teachers to disclose all organizations in which they had been
members in the past 5 years unconstitutionally interfered with freedom of associa-
tion); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (school teacher dismissed
for incompetency based on the refusal to answer questions about activities). See also
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (criminal syndicalism statute which
punished mere advocacy of the use of force which is not directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action held unconstitutional); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960) (disclosure of membership lists would significantly interfere with
freedom of association when the state demonstrated no controlling justification for
such interference); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (a sufficient state
interest to obtain an association's membership list was not shown). See generally
Note, The First Amendment Over-Breadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
43. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968).
44. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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cluded that Arizona had engaged in such questioning. 45  A key factor
in the record which led to this conclusion was the bar committee's rea-
soning as to why it was entitled to an answer to question 27 regarding
membership in the Communist Party or any organization which advocates
the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.46
The Court thus determined from the record that the Arizona Bar Com-
mittee made inquiries about protected beliefs and views.
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion also considered that the ex-
planation of the committee's purpose in asking the question made it
"clear that the question must be treated as an inquiry into political be-
liefs,' 47 and thus cast his vote against the state. Justice Stewart, not go-
ing as far as Justice Black, reiterated that under certain circumstances
simple inquiry into present or past Communist Party membership of an
applicant for admission to the bar is not as such unconstitutional. 48
However, with respect to questions as to membership in organizations
advocating forceful overthrow of the government, a state's inquiry is lim-
ited to knowing membership.49 Thus, question 27 also faltered on this
ground.
Justice Blackmun in the principal dissent ° read the record quite dif-
ferently. Concerning question 27 he stated that "a realistic reading of
the question discloses that it is directed not at mere belief, but at advo-
45. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971).
46. Brief for Petitioner, at 5-6; Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8 n.8
(1971): "Unless we are to conclude that one who truly and sincerely believes in the
overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence is also qualified to
practice law in our Arizona courts, then an answer to this question is indeed appro-
priate. The Committee again emphasizes that a mere answer of 'yes' would not lead
to an automatic rejection of the application. It would lead to an investigation and in-
terrogation as to whether or not the applicant presently entertains the view that a vio-
lent overthrow of the United States Government is something to be sought after. If
the answer to this inquiry was 'yes' then indeed we would reject the application and
recommend against admission." (Emphasis added by the Court).
47. Id. at 9.
48. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo,
366 U.S. 82 (1961).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967); LSCRRC v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1971).
50. In a separate dissent applicable to both Baird and Stolar, Justice White
held that a state may ask applicants preliminary questions which will permit further
investigation and judgment as to whether the applicant will or will not advise lawless
conduct as a lawyer. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1971).
Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion dissenting in Baird and Stolar and concurring
in Wadmond, rejected Justice Black's reading of the records and saw the Court's
supervision over state bar admission procedures as a most extravagant expansion of
the current chilling effects approach to first amendment doctrine. Id. at 34-36.
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cacy and at the call to violent action and force in pursuit of that advo-
cacy." 51 He considered the key words in the excerpt from the commit-
tee's memorandum5 2 to be whether "violent overthrow . . . is something
to be sought after," and thus concluded that it was an inquiry into will-
ingness to participate in violence. 53
The Stolar case expanded Baird by holding as unconstitutional two
questions which required a listing of all organizations to which the appli-
cant belonged. 54 The Court reasoned that law students who know that
they must survive such a screening process before admission to the bar
are encouraged to protect their future by shunning unpopular or con-
troversial organizations. 55
Stolar refused to answer a third question [12(g)] about membership
in any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of
the United States. The Court held this question to be impermissible on
the basis of Baird.56
Baird and Stolar thus extended first amendment protections to bar
admission proceedings. 57  However, the Court in Wadmond limited this
expansion and set a standard for permissible inquiry by bar examining
committees. The holdings in Baird and Stolar seem to be irreconcilable
with Wadmond, but a careful examination of the factual record in Wad-
mond will reveal their consistency.
The difference in Wadmond is reflected by Justice Stewart who shifted
sides and joined the dissenters of Baird and Stolar. In writing the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Stewart first upheld New York's general require-
ment that bar applicants must possess good character and fitness. 58  The
Court then proceeded to consider Rule 9406 of the New York Civil Prac-
51. Id. at 17.
52. Supra note 46.
53. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 19 (1971).
54. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
55. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
56. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971).
57. While the Court considered Baird and Stolar on first amendment grounds,
both petitioners also sought to assert fifth amendment claims against self-incrimina-
tion. Brief for Petitioner at 39-43, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971). Brief for Petitioner at 48-50, In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971). The
Court has held that a lawyer in a disbarment procedure can assert the fifth amend-
ment privilege. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). However the question
must still be decided with reference to bar admission procedures.
58. All states have a similar requirement. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal-
ifornia, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957);
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). See generally 5 MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (103d ed. 1970).
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tice Law and Rules which requires an applicant to the bar to furnish
satisfactory proof to the effect that he "believes in the form of the gov-
ernment of the United States and is loyal to such government."' 9  This
rule reflects the requirement that an applicant must swear (or affirm)
that he will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State
of New York. On its face, the language of Rule 9406 seemed to require
an applicant to furnish proof of his belief in the form of the government
of the United States and of his loyalty to the government. This construc-
tion of the language would pose substantial constitutional questions as to
the burden of proof permissible in such a context under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment,60 and as to the permissible scope of
inquiry into an applicant's beliefs under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. 61
However, Justice Stewart noted that the appellees in the case were the
very state authorities who were entrusted with the definitive interpreta-
tion of the language of the rule and that the construction given by the
appellees was "both extremely narrow and fully cognizant of protected
constitutional freedoms."' 62  Accepting the construction, Justice Stewart
found "no showing of an intent to penalize political beliefs." 63  This
lack of intent to penalize political beliefs was also a distinguishing feature
of Konigsberg H and A nastaplo.
The Court also considered the validity of a two part question (number
26) about membership in any organizations which advocated the over-
throw of the government by force. 64 Part (a) of the question inquired
59. NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES, article 94, rule 9406 (McKin-
ney 1963).
60. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (held that taxpayers in order to
obtain tax exemptions could not be required to bear the burden of proof that they
did not advocate violent overthrow of the government).
61. See, e.g., Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (loyalty oaths requiring
teachers to swear respect for the flag and institutions of the United States and the
State of Washington and state employees to swear that they were not members of a
subversive organization held invalid on their face because their language was unduly
vague, uncertain and broad). For further elaboration of oaths see generally Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945);
Brown and Fasset, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV.
480 (1953).
62. LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 163 (1971). As interpreted by the
state authorities (1) the rule placed no burden of proof upon the applicants, (2) the
"form of the government of the United States" and the "government" referred solely
to the Constitution, which is all that the oath mentions, and (3) "belief" and
"loyalty" meant no more than willingness to take the constitutional oath and the
ability to do so in good faith.
63. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 54 (1961).
64. In Wadmond the Court also upheld the constitutional validity of question
1972]
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whether such membership was "knowing." If this part was answered
in the affirmative, the applicant was then required to answer part (b)
which asked if the applicant had the "specific intent" to further the aims
of the organization during the period of knowing membership. Justice
Stewart held that the question was tailored to conform to the relevant
decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court had previously held that
knowing membership in an organization advocating the forceful overthrow
of the government by one sharing the specific intent to further the organi-
zation's illegal goals, may be made criminally punishable.6 5 Justice Stew-
art further concluded that the division of question 26 into two parts was
permissible under Konigsberg II which approved asking whether an ap-
plicant had ever been a member of the Communist Party without asking
in the same question whether the applicant shared its illegal goals.6 ,
Crucial to the reconciliation of Wadmond with Baird and Stolar is
Justice Stewart's assessment of the record in Wadmond. Twice in his
opinion Justice Stewart pointed to the fact that there was no showing that
any applicant for admission to the New York bar had been denied ad-
mission either because of his answers to these or any similar questions
or because he had refused to answer them.67  Twice he also noted that
the state agents had shown every willingness to keep their investigations
within constitutionally permissible limits. 8  Therefore, the Court was not
persuaded that the careful administration of such a system as New York's
would necessarily result in "chilling effects" upon the exercise of consti-
tutional freedoms.69
27 of the New York questionnaire which asked if there was any reason why the
applicant could not take the oath supporting the constitution and whether the
applicant was loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States
without any mental reservation? The Court considered the question as simply sup-
portive of the appellees' task of ascertaining the good faith with which an applicant
can take the constitutional oath. LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165
(1971).
65. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961).
66. LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165-66 n.19 (1971).
67. Id. at 158, 165.
68. Id. at 163, 167.
69. Id. at 167. In one of the two dissenting opinions Justice Marshall held that
rule 9406, as written, sanctioned systematic inquiry into beliefs and also noted the
fact that the majority opinion pointed to no New York case law that showed what
the proffered state interpretation meant. Id. at 189-90. Justice Marshall also
criticized the state's inquiries into bar applicants' willingness to take the constitu-
tional oath. He stated that the Court had previously held that the power to test
the sincerity of a person who must take an oath of constitutional support "could be
utilized to restrict the right . . . under the guise of judging . . . loyalty to the Con-
stitution." Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966). Justice Marshall saw fur-
ther problems with part (a) of question 26. He found it overbroad and an indis-
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Thus, summarizing the law as it stands today in respect to bar admis-
sion inquiries into political beliefs and associations, it is still permissible
on the basis of Konigsberg II for a state to inquire into Communist Party
membership and to exclude an applicant for refusal to answer. On the
basis of Baird a state may not inquire about a bar applicant's beliefs or
associations solely for the purpose of denying him admission because of
what he believes. Stolar prohibits requiring a listing of all organizations
to which the applicant belongs. Wadmond limits Baird and Stolar by per-
mitting a state to ask if the applicant was a knowing member of an or-
ganization which advocates the forceful overthrow of the government,
and if so, whether the applicant during his period of membership had
the specific intent to further the organization's aims. A state can further
require an applicant to have the willingness and ability to take an oath
to support the Constitution of the United States as well as the state con-
stitution.
Baird, Stolar and Wadmond have added first amendment protections
to bar admission procedures. 70 However, these three cases did not over-
rule the previous bar admission cases which were decided on the basis
of the fourteenth amendment. In future cases the Court could revert
back to an emphasis on due process. The Court will not have to wait
too long before it will be faced again with these problems. The activist
criminate and intrusive device designed to expose an applicant's political affiliations.
LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 196 (1971).
In his dissent Justice Black came back again to his "absolute" theory and stated
that a state cannot exclude an applicant because he has belonged to organiza-
tions that advocated violent overthrow of the Government, even if his membership
was "knowing" and he shared the organization's aims. Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Black objected to the inquiry of question 27 concerning whether an applicant is
loyal to the Constitution "without mental reservation." He distinguished between
this type of oath which requires an applicant to hold a certain belief (loyalty
to the Constitution) from the constitutional oaths that are promissory oaths in
which the declarant promises that he will perform certain duties in the future.
LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 178-79 (1971).
Justice Black could not reconcile the two part question, 26(a) and 26(b) with
Baird and Stolar. The Court's allowing the knowledge and specific intent ele-
ments to be split into two parts allowed the state to force an applicant to supply
information about his associations which are protected by the first amendment.
Justice Black considered that even combining the two parts would not satisfy
previous Court standards. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
70. The Baird, Stolar and Wadmond cases are not part of any one theory of con-
stitutionally protected rights. There are elements of the "absolute" theory, the
"balancing of interests" theory, the "overbreadth" doctrine and the "chilling effects"
doctrine. There is as yet no prominent trend toward one theory in this area of
constitutional law,
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college students of the late 60's and early 70's will soon be presenting
themselves before bar examining committees. Present and former mem-
bers of S.D.S. and like organizations are sure to evoke probing inquiries
from bar examiners.
There are some indications that a shift back to fourteenth amendment
grounds is possible. First, with the departure of Justices Black and Har-
lan and the formation of the "Nixon Court," the close 5-4 decisions could
easily turn away from any expansion of first amendment protections. A
second indication is Justice Blackmun's dissent in Baird where he noted
that there has been
an overabundance of courtroom spectacle brought about by attorneys-frequently
those who, being unlicensed in the particular State, are nevertheless permitted, by
the court's indulgence, to appear for clients in a given case. 71
A third indication is the fact that Chief Justice Burger has called upon
the legal profession to sternly regulate itself from within if it wants to
avoid regulations from the outside and has noted that the licensing and
admission of lawyers "has led to a hodge-podge of standards, and regula-
tions are desperately in need of careful examination.17 2
The only consensus that can be reached in this confused realm of con-
stitutional law is that the Supreme Court will not allow bar committees to
penalize applicants because of their political beliefs and associations.
This negative stance should compel the legal profession to reassess its
own strength and to use this strength not to prohibit but to open its doors
to applicants with diverse political views and associations.
John J. Lynch
71. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 21 (1971). Cf. INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE (Paris Edition), August 11, 1971, at 5, col. 4, where Mr. Kuntsler
discussed the problem of unruly lawyers and stated: "There is not an uncivil lawyer.
It's a myth he [Justice Burger] is deliberately creating to control the bar. . ..
They are afraid of this new breed of lawyer coming out of law school."
72. CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 6, 1971, § IA, at 4, col. 4.
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